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THE LOGIC AND STRUCTURE OF TIME 
 
Abstract 
In this project, we aim to find an explanation of the concept of time. We discuss various 
philosophical theories about the concept. Quickly, we discover that the questions about time 
are primarily about the status of the future, and that we need to look into temporal logic to 
deal with this. That leads us to examining the different structures of time, before dealing with 
the various subjective perceptions of time, that is, philosophical theories. We find that the two 
major theories of time both lead to seemingly insoluble problems; either we will have to 
rework the entire temporal logic systems, or we face an existentialistic issue with 
determinism. Thus we can conclude that no existing theory of time is perfect. 
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Introduction 
 
Throughout history, the concept of time is one whose definition has always remained elusive 
to even the greatest thinkers of mankind. Augustine perhaps formulated it best when he said: 
 
“If no one asks me what time is, then I know very well; but when someone asks me, I cease to 
know”.1 
 
While this quote may be ages old, today we still have a problem when it comes to explaining 
exactly what time is and how it works. Sure we can all tell the time from our watches and 
relate to things having happened before or after each other, but to find an explanation of the 
concept itself is a problem rooted in both logic and epistemology as well as in metaphysics. 
Effectively this project attempts to map and account for the theories and perceptions that have 
been applied in search for a solution this far, hoping to provide the explanation that eludes 
Augustine or at least an overview of how far science has gotten towards it. 
 
Cardinal Question: 
How can time be explained? 
- How do we perceive it? 
- How do we handle it logically? 
- How is it structured? 
- What philosophical theories handle time, how do they do it, and what are their 
implications and problems? 
 
Motivation 
Trying to explain the motivation for the pursuit of an explanation of time feels like stating the 
obvious. Surely it is futile to argue against the significance of the part time plays in our lives. 
It is in point of fact an omnipresent circumstance that we are constantly forced to relate to, 
deal with, and communicate within the context of. Thus the value of being able to explain 
what time is should already be evident. 
 
                                                 
1 Priest, p. 55 
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Throughout the project itself, the reader will find that the motivation will be strengthened 
even more, as we come upon critical problems with the currently existing theories that 
attempt to explain time. It will become apparent that, how ever we choose to perceive time, it 
ends up having an effect on logics, the truth of statements, the validity of freedom of choice, 
and the premise for natural science, effectively putting further stress on the search for an 
absolutely conclusive explanation. 
 
All of this will be explained in due time, as the reader is taken from the initial motivation of 
the problem stated by Aristotle, to the problems being discussed by the minds of today, so rest 
assured that, in case the fact that time is all around you is not enough to get one interested, 
this project should contain enough serious implications to do so. 
 
Methodology 
Since this project is concerned with logical structures of time as well as philosophical 
theories, our main method of acquiring knowledge has been to investigate various logical, 
structural and philosophical theories of time, in order to compare and discuss them. Our 
material has thus consisted of various books and a limited use of websites, primarily the 
online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
which we consider thorough works on philosophy. Our approach gave us a possibility to 
investigate various theories of time, from the age of Aristotle to present day. Including 
temporal logic and the structure of time, in our opinion, adds an extra dimension to the project 
and our understanding of time. 
 
Our method may limit us to solely considering pre-existing structures and theories of time, 
however, arguably it is not within the scope of a second semester project to devise new 
philosophical theories. Part of the process of discussing existing theories is of course to 
critically examine them, and be aware of their potential as well as their limitations. 
 
While other methods like fieldwork, empirical work, interviews etc. may be useful and 
relevant in connection to other projects we did not consider it so in relation to ours. 
For example, investigating physical time in any empirical way, is a task suited for advanced 
studies in the natural sciences, rather than the humanities. 
 
Dimensions 
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This project deals with the logic, structure and philosophy of time. We look into various 
philosophical theories of time, consequently, the project is mainly anchored within the 
dimension of Science and Philosophy. Furthermore, through temporal logic we deal with the 
logical structure of sentences and the language of logic, and in philosophy we consider the 
truth-value of statements, as well as examine different philosophical theories in language. All 
of which we would argue falls within the dimension of Text and Sign.  
 
While we do touch ancient notions of time and historical philosophical theories, we do not 
consider the historical dimension a substantial part of the project. Rather, we use the historical 
basis as a point of departure when looking into newer theories of time, for example branching 
time etc. As such, this project is not anchored in the History and Culture dimension nor the 
dimension of Subjectivity and Learning. 
 
On Thought Mapping 
Throughout our project we will be dealing with multiple theories within multiple fields, and 
we ourselves have found it difficult to constantly maintain an overview of the connections, 
implications and directions of the reasoning taking place. To ease the reading process we have 
chosen to lay down a map of the different themes our work progresses through. They are 
connected by arrows illustrating implications and the direction of our reasoning. 
 
The map is not meant to be understood before reading the rest of the project, as much as it is 
meant as a reference assisting the reader in navigating between different chapters and 
following our chain of thought. 
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What is time? 
Mind-map 
How do we 
perceive time? 
We perceive time through change. 
 
Is time a physical thing that exists 
independently from change? 
Since we have little chance of perceiving time in other ways than through change, that question becomes 
next to impossible to answer. 
 
Therefore we must realise that the way we tend to deal with time is subjective to our perceiving it through 
change. This moves the focus of our project from time itself to our psychological perception of it.  
As the question still stand, “how can time be explained”, we turn to Aristotle’s famous logical problem of 
the “Sea Battle Tomorrow”, to realise that there is an immediate problem in the way we treat time in the 
context of our language. Defining the nature of the future, and statements about events located in it, 
becomes essential to deciding if time flows or not. 
In dealing with logic, we encounter the 
problem that it, as based on the Principle of 
Bivalence is incapable of dealing with future 
events, unless they are defined as given even 
before they happen. 
Research into the structure of time reveals two 
prominent proposed structures, namely linear 
and branching. One allows for one certain 
future to be true and the second suggests 
multiple possible futures. 
We come upon a fork in the road, having to choose to either define the future as being uncertain and live 
with the falsity of our Principle of Bivalence or define it as being certain. Theories that deal with the two 
options are known as A- and B-theories, and we look into the premises of the two categories 
A-Theory: 
 
Time flows objectively, from the future, 
through the present, into the past. The future is 
uncertain and is neither true nor false until it 
becomes present 
B-Theory: 
 
Time flows only subjectively, and is static in 
nature, allowing for events in the future to be as 
real and true as those in the past and present. 
Presentism: 
Commonly connected with A-theory. Only the 
present, as well as things of the past that still 
affect the present, are real and have truth-
values. 
Eternalism: 
Commonly connected with B-Theory. Time 
works like a 4th dimension and points in time 
are like points in space, we simply travel 
trough it in a linear fashion. All points exist 
equally. 
Problem A: 
Demise of the Principle of Bivalence, our 
classical system of logic and the premise of 
natural science. 
Problem B: 
Falsity of the notion of free human agency. 
Reduction of choices to effects of deduction 
and reduction of events to effects of previous 
events. 
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Perceptions of Time 
 
As was already stated by Augustine, it is rather difficult to describe time. Yet Augustine also 
said, he himself had a quite clear idea about the notion of time. Like Augustine, everybody 
has an idea of time; however, it is clear that everyone does not have the same notion about 
time. In other words, there are many different perceptions of time. That is, there are many 
subjective perceptions of time. 
 
All these perceptions of time – all the subjective notions of time – are called psychological 
perceptions of time. Psychological because they are all ideas about time, created within our 
minds, by philosophers, logicians, scientists, you, me, everyone. Yet, we do not know if our 
perception – indeed, if any perception of time – is true in any sense other than to us. That is, 
true in an objective sense.  
 
Some philosophers argue that there exists such an objective notion of time. Contrary to our 
different subjective views of time, this idea of objective time is called physical time, though it 
is also known as real time and super time. However, if objective time exists, it has yet to be 
proven. 
 
Even before we have started to look into the psychological perceptions of time, we can see 
that there are two ’categories’, two overall notions of time, objective and subjective, physical 
and psychological perceptions of time. 
 
Since we already know that there are several different psychological perceptions of time, the 
idea of physical time is a logical starting point for the project. If we choose to start off with 
examining psychological time, we would not know which of the several theories we should 
use as a starting point. However, if the notion of objective time is real, there should be one 
truth about time – one starting point. Thus, we will start the project by examining physical 
time, especially by looking into the shortcomings of the theory. This will in return help us 
identify some of the problems of time, and should hence be practical when moving further on 
with the project.   
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Physical Time 
Physical time is the concept of time as something not defined by our impressions of it, but as 
a physical process that would take place, regardless of whether we were there to observe it or 
not. It is an idea that runs contrary to the concept of psychological time, in which time is 
something subjective that we perceive and through our perception of it, we create it. Although 
these ideas are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they do require that we be more specific 
when we ask questions such as “what is time?”. 
 
Physical time is what the clock sitting on the mantelpiece measures, second by second, 
although our own perception of time (psychological time) can be very different from the one 
the clock portrays. Imagine if you will, a dull afternoon with nothing to do, during which you 
would really much rather be doing something. Time in this case would feel longer, unlike, 
say, the same duration of time spent having a good time with friends or family. 
 
We also have a perception of time having passed when we sleep. We know that we have slept 
for one night, not for one month. Being under general anesthetic, however, stops our 
perception of psychological time, and we thus wake up with no feeling of how long we have 
been unconscious. 
 
When the subject is not one's personal experiences, but something more specific (like 
quantum mechanics or the study of physics for example), physical time is what is employed. 
Just by saying that time is physical, however, is not a definite answer. A relevant question 
could be “is time change?”, for that is how most of us encounter it in our lives. If there was no 
change, would time still exist? Or is time something more than just isotope half-lives and 
trees shedding leaves? Is there a sort of “super time”, which would continue to flow (if time 
does flow, that is) even in a “dead” universe? 
 
That is what Aristotle believed, when he said that “time is the measure of change”, but he 
emphasised “that time is not change [itself]” because a change “may be faster or slower, but 
not time...”2. As can be seen, one of the issues which is apparent when it comes to defining 
the nature of time, at least in the physical definition of it, is the question of how time passes. 
If we define time as merely the occurrence of change, which is a common enough idea, as that 
                                                 
2 Dowden, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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is how we experience it, does time pass at all without change? In our daily lives we see the 
effects of time constantly, and we are forced to deal with them. Seasons change, everyone 
grow old and die, clocks tick. Some would argue that if we were to freeze these changes, to 
stop them in their tracks so to speak, that would slow or even stop the flow of time. If, for 
example, we took a tree from a forest somewhere and placed it in something like a ‘time 
bubble’, thereby completely stopping its growth, would the concept of time suddenly have 
ceased to be factor within the time bubble? Or is time a constant, natural necessity that will 
continue no matter the circumstances and possible lack of change in the universe. This 
concept is known as ‘super time’. 
The proponents of super time would argue that while change may be a series of events sorted 
in chronological order, they are not time itself, and that time would continue even were they 
absent. Picture the universe in its entirety, with all it contains of actions and reactions, 
freezing up for a span of time (already there do we have problem) where nothing moved, no 
action was taken, and rain drops hung frozen in the air. If that happened, and then suddenly 
started up again, what would that do to our conception of time? If we say that the amount of 
time which passed while the world lay frozen in its tracks was, say, 48 years, did those 48 
years even exist at all? We, as observers to the events of the world, would never be the wiser, 
for we could not possibly have noticed time passing, as nothing moved, not even us. So, does 
this mean that that expanse of time is not time at all? 
If one accepts the notion of super time as something more than just change, you would 
probably argue that those 48 years did in fact exist, and the fact that no change occurred 
within them is completely irrelevant. That same proponent might also argue that the concept 
of time did not begin with the “creation” of the universe at the Big Bang, and that even if 
reality before that instant was an eternity of changeless nothingness, time (super time) would 
still have been there, ticking away as a constant. This of course links well with an infinite idea 
of time, with no starting point, and, due to its scientific nature, with the notion of linear time, 
where all actions are a reaction to a previous action. 
If one disagrees with the concept of super time however, defining time becomes more 
complex, for it is not enough to just say that time is change. How much change is time? If, as 
with the example of the tree before, a small section of the universe has been frozen 
completely static, does time then not exist within that box? Or, as with the universe example, 
 11
if a single of those raindrops falls to the ground, does time exist then, for the entire universe, 
or just for that raindrop? 
 
From Physical Time to Psychological Time 
As should be clear, it is rather abstract to discuss physical time. The implications of time as an 
objective entity that exists separately from the universe leads to more questions than answers, 
as can be seen here. Thus, we can already conclude that in order to get a better understanding 
of time, we will have to concentrate on the other overall idea of time, namely, on the 
subjective perceptions of time.  
 
We did, however, learn something useful; time is perceived through change. This is the 
immediate truth for all the psychological notions of time. Thus, in order to examine the 
subjective perceptions of time, we will have to briefly consider the notion of change. 
 
If we disregard the time bubbles and frozen universes of the idea of physical time, we can 
assume that change is given. Everything will change. A common feature – one could say, the 
only true common feature – of all the different psychological ideas of time, is that things will 
change because of the passing of time. That is, things will only change now – in the present – 
or in the future. The past is set, inalterable.  
 
This means, that in order to examine psychological time, one will need to concentrate on the 
psychological perceptions of the present and the future. These are the points of interest. 
Therefore, all theories of time we cover from now on in the project will mainly be conserned 
with the future. Now we will look into logic, before we examine psychological time further. 
As will be seen, more concepts about time need to be established before we are properly 
equipped to take on the psychological aspects of perceiving time. 
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Introducing Logic 
 
When one thinks about it, time is a part of every aspect of life; the life cycle (divided into 
years, months, days, etc.), religion, sciences – it is not possible to find one aspect of our 
everyday life that is not affected by the thought of time.  
 
Time can be thought of in different ways, but for the people who have tried to dissect the 
contents of time, logic has come to play a major part in the discussion. Logic can be defined 
as “…system or principles of reasoning applicable to any branch of knowledge or study”3, 
and the first thinker to talk in terms of a fully developed logical system was the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC). Aristotle concerned himself with the study of deductive 
inference, in which one reaches a conclusion on the basis of evidence and reasoning, and in 
particular with regards to the study of dialectics. He studied how we speak and what we say, 
and in especially how time affects the truth-value of the statements spoken. 
 
Now, when speaking about logic and the truth-value of statements, it soon becomes clear that 
time really is a factor that needs to be taken into consideration seeing as all language is based 
in time and thus all statements as well. This will not pose a problem as long as we discuss 
statements in the present or the past tense, but what happens when we utter a statement about 
the future? 
 
We take our point of departure in two basic assumptions about time, firstly, that time has only 
one direction. Secondly, the Principle of Bivalence, which states that a proposition is either 
true or false, but cannot be both4. We then encounter a problem about the status of the future. 
This problem is concerned with the truth-value of the future, and can best be explained with a 
famous example laid out by Aristotle.  
His example, ‘The Sea Battle Tomorrow’, of how time affects a statement, was first presented 
to us in his book ‘On Interpretation’: 
 
The central problem is how to interpret two statements: 
‘Tomorrow there will be a sea battle’. 
                                                 
3 Dictionary.com 
4 We would like to emphasise the importance of the Principle of Bivalence as we are going to 
refer to it on numerous occasions.  
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‘Tomorrow there will not be a sea battle’.5 
 
Either the sea battle will happen or it will not, but today there is nothing that makes the 
statement ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow’ true. The problem arises when realising that 
neither is there anything today that will make the statement ‘there will not be a sea battle 
tomorrow’ true, due to the fact that the event might occur. 
The first resulting thought is that both statements must be false, but if the sea battle does in 
fact take place the day after (that is, tomorrow) the statement uttered today, ‘there will be a 
sea battle tomorrow’ seems to be true today as well. 
  
It is when working with these types of contradictory statements the need for a temporal logic 
shows itself very clearly, because how can a statement be given a truth-value, when it has not 
happened yet? 
 
Aristotle worked his way around to a solution that roughly states that since neither statement 
can be said to be neither true nor false it is impossible to say which proposition is correct. It is 
only tomorrow, when one of the possibilities reveals itself to be true, that the other becomes 
false. Thus Aristotle introduced contingency as a factor to the language of logics; logic will 
realise itself only after the contingent realisation of the statement has occurred6.  
 
Before we return to the more psychological perceptions of time, we will need to examine the 
logic of time, i.e. the temporal logic systems. This will help us to better identify the problems 
concerned with applying truth-values to statements about the future, which in turn will help us 
in researching psychological time 
 
Logic of Time 
Logical problems like the Sea Battle Tomorrow can be expressed through various logic 
systems. These systems can be very complicated, however, we believe it to be useful to 
provide at least a basic introduction. This can help give us an understanding of logical and 
philosophical problems, since the different logic systems and the various theories connected 
to logic clearly show how their interpretations of time and change differ.  
 
                                                 
5 Øhrstrøm & Hasle, p. 10 
6 Øhrstrøm & Hasle, p. 11 
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Before moving on to the actual temporal logic, we need to introduce the formal logic system, 
which the temporal logic system builds upon. Once the logic systems have been considered, 
we intend to apply them to the sea battle argument, as well as to briefly look into how 
temporal logic is applied to each of the two major categories within the philosophy of time, 
namely, the A- and B-theories. These will be explained further in the chapters on the structure 
and perceptions of time. 
 
Formal logic 
This section is a basic introduction to the formal logic system, which consists of modal 
operators and logical connectives. There are five logical connectives in the formal logic 
system, namely: 
¬  negation  ‘not’ 
  conjunction  ’and’ 
  disjunction  ’or’ 
→ implication  ‘if a then b’ 
↔  bi-implication  ’a if and only if b’ 7 
 
Lowercase letters represent atomic statements, for example, in the following we will use ‘p’ 
to represent the statement ‘there is a sea battle going on’. The logical connectives are then 
used to connect atomic statements like ‘p’ and ‘q’ and thereby form complex statements: ‘p 
→ q’. In this example, the two atomic statements p (here: ‘there is a sea battle going on’) and 
q (here: ‘the admiral is killed’) form the complex statement ‘if there is a sea battle going on, 
then the admiral is killed’. Once the truth-values of p and q are known it is possible to figure 
out the truth-value of the complex statement. This is done according to the ‘Principle of 
Bivalence’, which states that “every statement of language is either true or false”8. The 
Principle of Bivalence is a basic principle within logic. In logic, the exercise is to determine 
the truth-value of statements, in order to, for example, decide whether an argument is valid. 
 
The statements we will be considering are contingent statements, that is, statements that are 
true in some situations and false in others, as opposed to tautologies, which are always true 
                                                 
7 Hendricks, p. 20-22 
8 Hendricks, p. 1 
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and contradictions, which are always false.9 We will also be using the modal operators 
expressing necessity and possibility: 
 
N – ‘it is necessary that…’ 
M – ‘it is possible that …’ 
 
These are closely related to temporal logic when considering the necessary or possible future 
and they are important in relation to the philosophical dispute between determinism and 
indeterminism. Now that we have some basic logical terms in place, we will move on to our 
main interest in logic, namely, the question of how we express time in logic terms and which 
philosophical problems the various expressions entail. 
 
Temporal Logic 
So far we have not used logic when considering time in relation to statements. However, once 
we want to determine the truth-value of statements about the future things get rather 
complicated. For is it possible for a statement about the future to have a truth-value today?  
 
In order to show how logical problems like the Sea Battle Tomorrow can be expressed in 
terms of a temporal logic, we will introduce a few tense operators and apply them to the 
argument.  
In order to be able to express time in logic terms, A.N. Prior developed a tense logic in 
addition to the existing modal logic10. Prior created four tense operators, namely: 
 
P – ‘it has at some time been the case that...’  
F – ‘it will at some time be the case that...’ 
H – ‘it has always been the case that...’  
G – ‘it will always be the case that...’ 11 
 
The Logic of the Sea Battle Tomorrow 
We will now return to the problem of the Sea Battle Tomorrow. Many different suggestions 
of how to interpret the argument have been put forth by various philosophers and logicians. 
                                                 
9 Hendricks, p. 2-7 
10 Smith, p. 357-391 
11 Galton, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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The discussion boils down to the basic question of the status, or truth-value, of contingent 
statements about the future. Choosing a path can have many implications, and raises questions 
of e.g. determinism vs. indeterminism, the necessity of the Principle of Bivalence etc. 
Before getting into these discussions we will take a look at the argument in tense logical 
terms: 
 
p – ‘there is a sea battle going on’ 
¬p –  ‘there is not a sea battle going on’ 
 
F(1) – ‘it will be the case in one time unit’ – here: ’it will be the case tomorrow’ 
  
‘Tomorrow there will be a sea battle’  = F(1)p 
‘Tomorrow there will not be a sea battle’  = F(1) ¬p 
 
We will return to the various interpretations of how to determine the truth-value of F(1)p in 
the chapter on branching time. 
 
The Sea Battle argument can also be used to illustrate the difference between determinism and 
indeterminism. A deterministic tense logic would state that, NF(n)p    NF(n)  ¬ p  ’in the 
future, it will necessarily be the case that p, or it will necessarily be the case that not p’, is 
true. That is to say, the statement which turns out to be true was already true at the time of 
utterance. 
Aristotle himself took an indeterministic stance and argued that no contingent statement about 
the future can be necessarily true today12. This entails that the above statement is false, 
however, the conjunction MF(n)p    MF(n) ¬ p, ’possibly there will be a sea battle 
tomorrow and possibly there will not be a sea battle tomorrow’, is valid13.  
 
A- and B-Logic  
There are two basic categories to be considered in relation to the philosophy of time, namely 
A-theories and B-theories. The structural and philosophical issues related to the respective 
categories will be discussed later on. For now, we will attempt to show the difference between 
the A- and B-theories in temporal logic terms. A-logic goes under the name of ‘tense logic’ 
                                                 
12 Dowden, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
13 Øhrstrøm & Hasle, p. 10-12 
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whereas B-logic is also called ‘the logic of instants’14. The main difference between the two 
theories lies in the way in which they order events. The A-theories order events as being past, 
present or future, while B-theories see events in relation to each other, i.e. in their being 
before than, simultaneous with or after than. We will consider these theories throughout the 
report. 
Both the A- and B-logic uses the symbol ‘<’ (‘the before-after-relation’15), to express the 
temporal ordering of events, so that the event on the left hand side of  ‘<‘ happens before the 
one on the right hand side. This system is used to define the truth-value of statements at 
certain times. 
 
In A-logic, the ‘flow of time’ is expressed by ordering events using the before-after-relation in 
relation to the past or future. For example, the proposition p is set in time by using < to relate 
p to the two different instants t and t′. A proposition Pp (‘it has at some time been the case 
that...’) or Fp (‘it will at some time be the case that p’) can be given a truth-value according to 
the following model. 
 
‘Pp is true at t  if and only if  p is true at some time t′ such that t′ <t’  
‘Fp is true at t  if and only if  p is true at some time t′ such that t< t′’16 
 
This means that the statement ‘it will at some time be the case that p’ (Fp) is true in the 
instant t if the statement p is true at the instant t′, which is future in relation to t. 
When considering temporal logic from a B-theoretical perspective (‘the logic of instants’), we 
need to consider the relation between instants rather than use a past/present/future model. 
Consequently, the tense operators P, F etc. are of no use. In B-logic, instants are ordered in 
relation to each other instead. This leads to a new set of operators: 
 
‘TIME’ – a set of instants which are structured using < 
‘t’ – a temporal instant 
‘T(t,p)’ – the proposition ‘p is true at t’17  
 
                                                 
14 Øhrstrøm & Hasle, p. 203 
15 Øhrstrøm & Hasle, p. 205 
16 Galton, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
17 Øhrstrøm & Hasle, p. 205 
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Contrary to in A-logics, p is not considered a proposition in itself in B-logic. Rather, T(t,p) is 
a proper proposition, which goes to show that in B logics, propositions are not full fledged 
unless they are rooted in a specified instant in time. 
As we can see, the two temporal logic systems reflect the different ways in which the A- and 
B-theories order events. We will return to the A- and B-concepts later on in the report to 
analyse the structure of each approach as well as their philosophical implications. 
Even though the above tense operators are only a very small part of the temporal logic 
system, hopefully they will give an idea of the different approaches to the ordering of events 
that the A- and B-theories imply. 
 
While temporal logic is useful for considering the logical implications of the different models 
of time, it does not help us understand the structure of time let alone how we perceive time.  
The A- and B-theorists may each have created a suiting logic for their theory, however, this 
does not settle the dispute between the different philosophical approaches to time. Therefore, 
in order to get a deeper understanding of how time can be structured, we will now look into 
various structural models of time. 
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Structure of Time 
 
There is generally three ways to perceive the structure of time. These are called the linear 
flow of time, circular time and lastly branching time. In this chapter, we will look into the 
three different ideas of the structure of time, and examine what philosophical questions arise 
in connection to them. We will, however, mainly focus on the linear theory of time and the 
branching theory of time, the reason for which will be argued throughout the chapter. 
 
Linear Time 
The theories of linear time and circular time are the most ancient of the ideas of time. The 
idea of time as a single, straight line was first formulated by early Hebrew and Iranian 
thinkers; later it was adopted by Christian and Islamic theologians18. In relation to religion, 
linear time generally has a starting point, a beginning – the act of creation by God.  
 
Linear time can be shown like this. 
Linear time expl 119  
 
However, in this model of linear time it is clear that there is no starting point, no point of 
creation. This is because, in science, the time strands of linear time extends eternally in both 
directions (even though scientists believe the universe was created 14 billion years ago, one 
could thus argue the time line should start there. However, it does not start 14 billion years 
before the present, because some philosophers and scientists argue that time existed before 
this, as discussed in the chapter about physical time). 
 
Until the appearance of branching time in the 20th century, linear time was the primary theory 
of time in both science and philosophy. The main point of linear time is that ”nothing will 
stay as it was, everything will change20”. In the idea of linear time, time is said to be 
progressive. Everything will be altered in some way or other. Even phenomena that seem to 
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be constant or stable, for example the whiteness of an object, will change. Even though the 
whiteness appears to be identical with the same phenomenon – the same whiteness – of an 
instant ago, it is not. This is so because the phenomenon we were concerned with an instant 
ago does not really exist as opposed to the phenomenon we are contemplating now, which 
does in fact exist21. 
 
Back to the model. As can be seen, the model does not offer more than one option about the 
future. This means the future is set. Graphically, it can be shown like this 
Linear time expl 2  
 
The arrow-tip does not show the direction of time, rather it serves to show that the truth-value 
is given. Looking at the model, this means that there is a truth-value about the future; the 
future is given. We will now look more into this by applying temporal logic. Using Aristotle’s 
example from earlier about the sea battle tomorrow, there either will be a sea battle tomorrow 
or there will not. This can be shown like this  
Linear time expl 3  
Linear time expl 4  
 
We let p stand for ’there is a sea battle going on’ and F(1)p stands for ’there is going to be a 
sea battle tomorrow’, then in example 1, F(1)p is true. However, in example 2, F(1)p is false. 
 
This is clear to us. What is unclear, is, which one will it be? This we, Man, cannot tell. 
However, according to the linear model of time, the truth-value is determined at the time of 
utterance. 
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Circular Time 
Now we will shortly look into the idea of circular time. Like linear time, it has its roots in 
religion, especially Eastern religions like Hinduism and Buddhism. However, many ancient 
religions have also used the idea of circular in their teachings; it is among other things a 
prominent idea in many nature religions such as the old Incan and Mayan cultures.  
 
Like the name suggests, circular time can be shown geometrically as a circle 
Circular time expl 1  
 
As can be seen, the concepts of past, present and future all ‘floats’ within the circle. This is so 
because in the circular conception nothing is really new. Any event – any time – is a 
repetition of a former, or previous, event. Furthermore, it will be repeated an infinite number 
of times in the future22. 
 
This of course entails that the truth-value of the future is known. If the future has already been 
realised because it has happened before, been the past so to speak, it is set. The truth-value is 
thus given. One could illustrate it like this 
Circular time expl 2  
 
Remember, the arrow illustrates that the truth-value is determined. 
 
Even though this is clear, we will not focus on circular time. The idea of circular time is 
mainly religious, and does not really hold scientific acclaim, as it seems to require a 
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supernatural event to ‘re-set’ time. Thus, our attention will mainly be on linear and branching 
time, as we do not believe circular time will be of much use in describing and grasping time. 
It is primarily included here for the sake of completeness. 
 
Branching Time 
The notion of branching time differs from the two other theories of the structure of time as its 
model is not only composed of a single line of time, but on the other hand is made up of many 
(infinite) strands of time lines. The model of this branching time is ”a temporal structure 
which allows branching into the future”23. This means that the different ’branches’ of time 
lines are all possible futures. A model of branching time is shown here. Please note that it 
only branches into the future, hence the theory is called the branching future idea of time. 
Branching time expl 1  
E = event.  
 
It is here clear to see that for any event there is one explicit past. If we chose any one event 
(E0, E1,…, E15)  – let us say E6 – the past contains the linear ordered events leading up to 
the present (i.e. E6), represented here by the events E0, E1 and E324.  
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For each event or instant in a history, the times following that event are said to compose the 
possible future of the event. In relation to our example, events E12 and E13 are the 
(alternative) possible futures of the present event, E6.  
 
Furthermore, the events in the same ’rank’ – here the events E4, E5 and E7 – will be 
counterfactual, that is, if E6 ever happens, events E4, E5 and E7 will be beyond possible 
realisation25. The events in the same rank as the present would or could have become realised 
under different conditions; they are said to represent as pseudo-simultaneity of the present 
event.  
 
So far this is easy to make out based on the model of branching future showed above. 
However, the theory is not as simple as this, as there are several methods of interpretation of 
this general idea of branching time. A. N. Prior considered three different ways of 
interpretation, one based on the ideas of Kripke, one on the ideas of Ockham and one based 
on Peirce, the latter of which Prior favoured himself26. We will now work our way through 
the different ideas of branching time, using our old example of the Sea Battle Tomorrow. The 
difference in the different interpretations of branching time is solely concerned with the status 
of the future. Prior’s way to examine the different models was to investigate their different 
logical consequences. 
 
As mentioned, the first theory, Prior based on a letter from Saul Kripke. In this model, none 
of the two possible futures; there will be a sea battle and there will not be a sea battle, has 
superiority over the other.  
Kripke expl 1  
 
Here, the arrow-tips at the end of the branches represent that both possible futures are true in 
this model of branching time. If we again let p stand for ’there is a sea battle going on’ and 
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F(1)p stands for ’there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow’, then according to this idea of 
time, F(1)p ∧ F(1) ¬p is true27. 
 
The next idea of branching time disagrees with this interpretation. Inspired by William of 
Ockham, Prior formulated a model in which only one possible future is the true one. 
However, we as humans do obviously not know which one of them it is! Again we will look 
at a drawn model – two actually – and again the arrow-tip on the end of a branch means that 
this possible future is true; this is the one that will be the case tomorrow. Furthermore, p and 
F(1)p still hold the same meaning as in the example from before.  
Ockham expl 1 Ockham expl 2  
 
In Ockham ex. 1, ¬F(1)p ∧ F(1) ¬p is true, even though we will not know it as of now, and 
in Ockham ex. 2, F(1)p ∧ ¬F(1) ¬p is true. Yet again, this is so, even if we do not know it 
presently. However, this is not as simple as it looks. Tomorrow, there either will or there will 
not be a sea battle – only one option is possible. This entails that the truth-value of statements 
about the future are determined at the time of utterance, though we will obviously first know 
the truth-value if/when the event is realised. This is almost similar to the idea of linear time, 
as the truth-value of the future is determined at the time of utterance. Note that in Ockham’s 
model, it is the truth-value of the statement about the future that is given, rather than the 
future the statement speaks of. As such, the model is still a part of the branching theory of 
time. 
  
Prior’s third idea of branching future, inspired by the thoughts of Peirce and called the 
’Peircean model’ differs from the models by Prior/Kripke and Prior/Ockham, in the way that 
it rejects the view that one can speak about a true possible future and still make sense. Since 
there is no future yet, it is pointless to try to figure out which possible future is going to be 
true. If we let the arrow-tip and F(1)p bear the same meaning yet again, the Peircean model 
according to Prior will look like this: 
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Peircean expl 1        Peircean expl 
2  
 
As one can see in the first model, the hypothetical future, neither F(1)p ∧ F(1) ¬p is true. 
However, one could say that ¬F(1)p ∧ ¬F(1)¬p, would in fact be true. On the other hand, if 
some proposition – I use proposition 2, p2 – holds in all the possible futures of tomorrow – 
Prior regards a proposition like this as a necessary proposition – then F(1)p2 is true, as seen 
in the second model. 
 
These are the three models of branching time developed by Arthur Prior. Later, in 1979, the 
philosopher Hirokazu Nishimura came up with a new temporal model of branching future 
time. It somewhat resembles Ockham’s idea which Prior had contemplated earlier. Nishimura 
introduced the term or idea of a history into branching time. A history in relation to branching 
time is a linearly arranged set of instants or events. It can be called a set of times. For any two 
histories in a branching future model of time, there is an event of which the two histories have 
all the time (instants, events) in common, including that event, but do not share any time after 
the event28. 
Nishimura expl 1  
H = history. 
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As seen, the sea battle will happen in History 1, but it will not in History 2. Thus, F(1)p is 
true in respect to H1, and F(1)¬p is true in respect to H229. As can be seen, the truth-values of 
the individual histories are given. This is of course contrary to the other theories of branching 
time. However, we do not know which history will be realised out of the possible futures, and 
therefore Nishimura’s theory of time can still be classified as a branching theory.  
 
These are the prominent models of branching time. Though they are all slightly different, they 
obviously all share the most important part of the branching theory of time. That is, the truth-
value of the future is not given (with the exception of Nishimura’s theory obviously). In the 
first model, by Kripke, both the sea battle and no sea battle can happen, though none of the 
two possibilities has superior status over the other. This means that none of them is true while 
the other is not, and thus we do not get a clear truth-value of the future. The next model, by 
Ockham, states that only one of the possibilities is true, yet Man cannot possibly know which 
one. Therefore, the truth-value of the future is not given here either. This is so, even if the 
truth-value of statements about the future is actually given. In the third model, the Peircean 
model, it is futile to even start thinking of the truth-value of tomorrow. Lastly, Nishimura in a 
similar line of thought as Ockham argues that even though the future of the individual 
possible futures is given, it is impossible to know which future will be realised. 
 
Thus, when comparing branching time to linear time, it is clear to see the big difference 
between the two theories. In the linear theory of time, the truth-value of the future is given, 
while it is not in the branching theory of time. 
 
Now we have worked our way through the three most prominent ideas of the structure of 
time, especially the two scientifically most important ones. However, as mentioned before, 
the linear and the branching future theory far from agree about determining the truth-value of 
the future. Branching time entails that the truth-value is not given, linear time entails that it is. 
This leads to a rather big issue, namely, is the truth-value of the future determined or not? 
This is a philosophical debate, as this question basically is concerned with if the future is 
given – is set – or not. That is, a question about determinism.  
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As mentioned, a philosophical question. Yet, before one can start a philosophical debate, one 
needs to have philosophical knowledge. So, in a debate about philosophy of time, we will 
need to look into a few different philosophical theories of time. Furthermore, we will have to 
look into the philosophical theories that are concerned with, among other things, the structure 
of time, as it is from here the question stems from. Thus, the next chapter is first concerned 
with two philosophical theories of time and their different perceptions of time. After the 
theories have been explained, we will resume to the question of the truth-values of the future 
from a philosophical standpoint. Furthermore, when the philosophical theories are clear to us, 
the question will be even more so.  
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Psychological Time 
 
So at last we arrive at the psychological perceptions of time. The perceptions we are 
concerned with in this project are philosophical theories about time, as already explained. 
Now that we have worked our way through both temporal logic and the various ideas of the 
structure of time, we are properly equipped to examine the subjective notions about time. The 
chapter about temporal logic provided us with an insight into the problems connected with 
future events and statements, and it is from the structure of time the philosophical theories 
stem. 
 
Psychological time refers to the fact that we have a subjective perception of time. As 
mentioned in the chapter on temporal logic, we have two overall categories of perceptions of 
time, namely, the A-theories and the B-theories. There are many different theories of time 
within each of these two areas of psychological time, however, once we arrive at investigating 
individual theories, we will be focusing on two theories, namely ‘presentism’ and 
‘eternalism’. We have chosen these two theories because they are commonly considered as 
belonging to the A- and B-categories respectively, and will thus serve as examples of 
opposing theories of time. Before we look into presentism and eternalism, however, we will 
provide an overview of the perceptions of time put forth by the A- as well as the B-theories. 
This should lead to an understanding of how they differ in their perception of time and 
provide a basis for discussing the philosophical implication of each stance.  
 
A- & B-theories 
The concept of A- and B-theories was put forth by J.M.E. McTaggart. The two sets of 
theories are distinguished by the way in which they view events in relation to time. Events in 
the ‘A-series’ are arranged through their being past, present or future, whereas events in the 
‘B-series’ are ordered in their relations to each other, i.e. being earlier than, simultaneous 
with, later than etc.30  
 
A-Theories 
Within the A-theories it is claimed that time is tensed. Events are organized in accordance to 
their being past or future in relation to the present, ‘now’. According to the A-theories time 
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flows, meaning that there is an objective flow of time when events change from being future 
to being present and then past. This perception of flow and change has given the A-theories 
the name ‘the dynamic theories’. There is some dispute about whether the flow of time is 
because of a change in properties, i.e. a change of the event itself, or if it is in the change of 
truth-values. Nevertheless, in spite of the minor differences in the understanding of the flow 
of time, the A-theories are united in their belief that there is an objective flow of time, that is, 
that events flow from the future through the present to the past. 
 
The A-theories correspond to the branching structure of time, leaving the truth-value of the 
future open. As is evident in the chapter on branching time, there are different theories of how 
to interpret the open character of the future, however, they all share the indeterministic stance 
that the future is not given.  
 
B-Theories 
Contrary to A-theories, the B-theories, also known as the static theories, state that time is 
tenseless, that time does not flow. This means that there is no past, present or future. This 
does not mean that B-theorists do not believe in events during and in time, but rather that they 
see past, present and future as directions in time. They believe the terms to be indexical. 
Consequently, points in time can be seen more like (the spatial) ‘here’ or ‘there’ than fixed 
locations.  
 
When B-theorists see the tenses as directions (here, there), it is of course seen as directions 
related to the observer. This means that the sentence ‘in the past, the Romans conquered the 
known world’ would actually mean ‘at some point in time prior to the one I currently occupy, 
the Romans conquered the known world’. Likewise, ‘I am reading a paper about time now” 
would to a follower of the B-theory mean ‘according to my perspective, I am reading a paper 
about time now’. 
 
If you picture the world in three dimensions you should have no problem dealing with the fact 
that there are things existing beyond the reach of your senses, simply because you know that if 
you move they will come into ‘view’. This same thought can be transferred to time, only 
where in the spatial dimensions we have the ability to, say, get into a car and drive wherever 
we like, in time our situation is more resembling a train ride. Our point of departure is set and 
so is the pace of our journey. We do not know our destination, but that does not necessarily 
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mean that one might not be set. In the same way, we might not know about things in the 
future, or even in the past, but that does not necessarily entail that they do not exist and do not 
have truth-values. The conflict between this idea and the ones in the A-series is that a 
statement like ‘yesterday it rained’ has no set value unless rooted somewhere along the line of 
time. 
Theories that fall under the B-series do not imply any distinct value to a statement based on 
whether it happened before, is happening or is yet to happen, be it linguistic or philosophical. 
Rather, it suggests that all events, while rooted different places in time, are equally real and 
that the truth of statements made about them depend on where in time it is uttered in relation 
to the event. 
 
In the following, we intend to give a deeper insight into the most significant differences 
between the A- and B-categories, by showing how they differ in their approach to interpreting 
statements linguistically as well as philosophically. 
 
In Language 
A- and B-theorists interpret statements differently linguistically. If someone says ‘p is true’, 
then the statement is interpreted by A-theorists as ‘p is true now’.31 This leaves space for the 
truth-value to change at any given moment, i.e. when p is not true anymore. Some A-theories 
suggest that the flow of time is evident in the change of the truth-value of a given statement 
from being indeterminate in the future to being determinate in the present and past. For 
example, the statement ‘the sun is shining now’ is true at a time when the sun is in fact 
shining and it is false when the sun is not shining. This may seem obvious, however, a B 
theorist would argue that the statement ‘the sun is shining now’ is useless without a 
specification of when ‘now’ is. This would give the statement a set truth-value. Consequently, 
when B-theorists claim that A-statements on their own are worthless; they need to have a B-
statement attached in order to install truth into them and translate their meanings. For 
instance, a sentence like ‘yesterday it rained’ can be both true and false and is thus worthless, 
unless it is linked to a sentence like ‘today it is the 5th of May 2008, and the day before today, 
it rained’.  
This shows the tenseless nature of B-statements. According to B-theories, all statements in the 
past tense can be rephrased into the present tense, whereupon a subjective perspective is 
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added linguistically. Consequently, the tense of the verb is not granted any significance. This 
is in opposition to the A-theories, in which tenses in language are to be taken linguistically 
serious such that if a sentence is in the past tense, then it means that it was in the past. 
 
It is important to notice that without the B-theories, depending solely on A-statements, truth-
values of statements change as the events they describe move from the future into the past, 
and as an effect it becomes difficult to index events in relation to each other, as well as 
maintaining a fixed idea of what is actually true. 
 
This original theory has taken criticism in more than one turn, seeing as the logical connection 
between an A-statement and B-statement stating its truth conditions, are not as immediately 
clear as they seem, the ambiguous nature of terms such as ‘meaning’ and ‘truth condition’ 
have led to the establishment both a 2nd a 3rd generation of the theory32.  
 
In Philosophy 
When it comes to philosophical aspects, it goes with B-theories as with A-theories that they 
are easier defined by their inadequacies than by their qualities.  
A-theories are useful in the sense that they allow for indeterminism. However, problems arise 
when it is not possible to apply truth-values to statements about the future, since this 
contradicts the Principle of Bivalence. If we disregard this principle, we neglect the entire 
basis of our logical system and thus we would need a completely new logic. 
 
The main issue connected to B-theories is the idea that events that are ahead of us in time 
have truth-values, suggesting that things in the future are not susceptible to change and that 
our fates are thus sealed. This of course does not go down well with any supporters of the idea 
of freedom of choice, and as we will look into later in our chapter on eternalism, the B-
theories have as much to answer for philosophically as their A-counterparts. When it comes to 
advantages however, it is interesting to notice how the B-theories do not necessarily disallow 
the existence of a physical super time, nor the existence of things in the past and future, in 
effect opening for possibilities not offered by the A-theories. 
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As is evident, the two series imply two very different ways of structuring and perceiving time. 
We will now present two theories of time, one from each category, in order to show the 
philosophical implications of each option. First we will look into presentism, which is 
compatible with the tensed A-series, second, we move on to the tenseless B-series and the 
theory of eternalism. Once these theories have been considered, we should be ready to discuss 
the outcome of choosing the respective stances. 
 
Presentism 
Presentism belongs to the A-theories of the philosophies of time, i.e. it is a tensed theory of 
time33. This entails that presentists believe that there is a difference between past, present and 
future. Presentists, as the name suggests, grant special significance to the presence, as they 
argue that only present objects exist and have properties and that the past and future are not 
real. For us to refer to an object, said object must exist now, otherwise the proposition cannot 
be true. There are various branches within presentism, which are more or less radical in their 
presentist views34. As an example, Lukasiewicz is of the opinion that only the part of the past 
that has some sort of reminders today has existed. If there is no evidence that an object has 
existed in the past, then it has not existed; it is merely a possibility that it has35. Not all 
presentists agree with this. A point of critique of presentism is that if only the present exists 
and all non-present objects are unreal, how can we talk about anything in the past, something 
that is not real?36 
 
Although the theory of presentism in itself does not entail a specific structure of time, due to 
its heavy reliance on the present as the only important notion when determining the truth-
value of statements, it could be seen as being philosophically compatible with the 
aforementioned concept of branching time. 
 
Since a proponent of presentism would argue that nothing can be said about the past or future 
(indeed, these things do not even exist to a presentist), a structure of time in which the future 
is undetermined, and therefore without truth-value, would probably appeal to him. 
Although that same proponent would probably also argue that the past would be equally 
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untrue, it might still be the most obvious solution for a presentist looking for a fitting 
structure.  
 
Eternalism 
Eternalism is most commonly seen as a B-theory, as it shares the same basic premise of the 
B-theories, namely, that time is tenseless. This means that all temporal points – all points of 
time – are equally real or ‘valid’, just as well as all spatial points are equally real. 
Eternalism does not grant the present a special ontological status, that is, it does not believe 
the present to be a ‘special’ part of reality, or the present to be a more important part of reality 
than other points in time.  
 
They argue that there is no objective ontological difference between past, present and future – 
all points in time are equally real, are all valid references. It is not that the eternalist 
philosophers have abandoned the use of past and future, but they believe the terms to be more 
of a sense of direction as whether something belongs in the past or the future is simply a 
matter of subjectivity, that is, which timeframe one uses as a reference for observing it. For 
example, we would all agree that we would rather feel the pain from a visit to the dentist in 
the past than now; however, even though we can all agree on something – it is better to have 
the pain ‘there’ (past) than ‘here’ (present) – it is still subjective. Thus, eternalists put forward 
the idea that the passage of time is totally dependent on the observer. Therefore, the flow or 
the passage of time is not objectively observed; eternalists do not believe in the flow or 
passage of time. 
 
This is also called the block universe theory. Inspired by physics, eternalists see time as 
another dimension, meaning that the universe – reality – is a block of space-time. Yet again 
the importance of the objective viewpoint is evident. Because it is only the subjective, the 
mental perspectives of the observer, that ’cuts’ the space-time into slices of past, present and 
future. For example, an event in person A’s present might be in person B’s future as well as in 
person C’s past. It all depends on the point of view, the observer’s frame of reference. 
 
The logical consequence of seeing past, present and future as being equally real, is that 
objects that exist in the past or future are equally real – they exist just as much as you and I. 
Eternalists believe that dinosaurs and future space ships are as real as this paper. Even though 
objects which are not present now – be it ‘past’ objects or ‘future’ objects – are not here right 
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now, they still exist just as much as objects which are present now. They just occupy other 
other points in time. 
 
As with all theories of time, there are some issues which eternalism cannot cover or explain. 
Eternalists will argue that if a statement about the future (a prediction so to speak) is uttered 
today, it is already true or false at the time of utterance. This opens up for discussions about 
determinism, and how eternalists see this. 
 
There are also issues related to the flow of time. As stated, eternalists do not believe in the 
flow of time, however, it is normally (if only subjectively) perceived as if there is a flow or 
passage of time. Eternalists argue that it does not matter, as it is only subjectively experienced 
by the observer. However, since their ideas are inspired by physics, they fail in giving an 
explanation as to how or why the ‘observer’ experiences the flow of time. 
 
When looking at the structure of time, eternalism belongs to the idea of linear time. This 
might seem somewhat strange thinking of the notion that it was stated earlier that ‘nothing 
will stay as it was, everything will change’. However, if we use the abovementioned example 
with the dinosaurs, we can find an explanation to this peculiarity: the dinosaurs still exists 
albeit not here, but there, which means that even though they are still in existence they are so 
in a different place – a place some people might want to call the past.  
 
Looking at the idea of branching time, it is obvious why eternalism does not belong to this 
structure; if everything already exists in different points of time, how could it be possible that 
we should be able to choose, what ‘path’ we want to take in the future? As all points in time 
are real, all points in time have a truth-value assigned to them. Thus, as ‘future’ points in time 
have truth-values, they are set. Consequently, there are no alternative options of the future; it 
is set. 
 
Two Directions, Two Roadblocks 
After having looked into the logic, structure and philosophy of time and investigated the 
implications of the most prominent theories, we find it practical to divide them all into two 
‘sides’ or ‘directions’, each with their own separate way of attempting to explain time, and 
each opposing the other. 
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For the sake of ease, we will be calling the two suggested directions for ‘Direction A’ and 
‘Direction B’, each corresponding obviously to either the A- or B-theory connected to it. 
 
Direction A 
Perception: A-theory 
Structure: Branching 
Philosophical theory: Presentism 
Problem: Demise of the Principle of Bivalence 
 
‘Direction A’ sides with the A-theorists in suggesting that time be perceived as tensed and 
allows for the possibility of the future being indeterministic. Here, we have designated it to be 
connected with presentism, but really it could also go with any other philosophy, as long as 
the premises of time flowing and the future being indefinite are upheld. Seeing as a premise 
for this direction is that the future is indefinite, a branching time-structure fits it best. 
 
The problem of this direction lies in its indeterministic nature. As we have mentioned earlier, 
suggesting that there is no way to tell the truth-value of a future event entails that we either 
cannot speak about the future at all, or that our fundamental logical Principle of Bivalence is 
insufficient when trying to do so.  
 
The problem seems to suggest introducing a third truth-value, that of ‘might come to be true’, 
into our logical system, however, seeing as the logical idea that everything is either true or 
false is so basic not only to language but also to natural science, this conclusion is not one we 
are eager to reach. 
 
Direction B 
Perception: B-theory 
Structure: Linear 
Philosophical theory: Eternalism 
Problem: Leads to determinism/fatalism 
 
‘Direction B’ aligns with the B-theorists and consequently says that every point in time is as 
real as both the next and previous ones and effectively, all of them must have a given truth-
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value. This would suggest for time to have a linear structure, with only one possible 
combination of events in the future being true. 
 
Practically, Direction B, in opposition to A, does not need to suggest that time is to be 
perceived in a subjective manner, and thus it is far more compatible with natural science and 
the study of a possible physical time. 
 
The B-theorists are very clear about the truth-value of future events being just as set as that of 
past ones, and thus there is no way in accordance that allows for the existence of multiple 
possible futures. Effectively Direction B starts to look similar to hard determinism or fatalism, 
concepts that deal with the thought of a set future and of freedom of choice being an illusion. 
More on these concepts will follow shortly. 
 
It is important to notice that the two ‘directions’ offered here are created by taking the most 
radical and uncompromising versions of the different theories, and that this by no means 
entail that there has been none who tried to take ‘the middle road’. Ockham, Nishimura as 
well as Aristotle and others have attempted to formulate versions of the different theories that 
incorporate properties that we have divided in our directions, effectively trying to be more 
compatible. However, these theories tend to deal mostly with how we are to deal with the 
future in language, rather than how it is actually supposed to work. Hence we have taken the 
liberty of leaving them out in the pursuit of explanations that are of philosophical rather than 
linguistic character. Evidently, linguistics are not left out of the project, but we are using it as 
a means to illustrate some of the problems with time, rather than for its own sake. 
 
That being said, we will now provide an overview over the concepts of determinism and 
fatalism, hoping to clarify to the reader their significance as logical consequences of Direction 
B. 
 
Determinism 
Also known as causal determinism, determinism is the idea that everything that takes place is 
the effect of something that has previously taken place. While the concept is old, it was not 
until the 18th century that someone started to try and clarify what it actually means. In 
determinism, the premises of physical science are opposed to the idea that we humans possess 
the freedom of choice, and to this day, philosophers who deal with the term still argue if both 
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are mutually exclusive or not. 
 
While causal determinism was the original name of the concept, it is currently spoken about 
exclusively as determinism, simply because causality is an area of it own. While determinism 
is connected to it, it is easier to deal with both if they are disentangled from each other - 
where causality is the idea of the connection between cause and effect, determinism deals 
with the thought of that connection existing between all events that ever take place. 
 
The best way, perhaps, to explain the idea of determinism, is to quote Pierre-Simon Laplace’s 
(1749-1827) famous thought-experiment known as ‘Laplace's Demon’. 
Laplace imagined that, if a being existed that knew of the locations of all particles in the 
universe, understood all the laws of physics and possessed the vast calculating power it would 
take to process that information in an instant, that being would be able to calculate every 
event of the entire future. By the laws of math and physics, it would be able to tell the future 
as accurately as the past, simply out of deduction; 
 
“We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and 
as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting in 
nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary positions of all things in the universe, 
would be able to comprehend in one single formula the motions of the largest bodies as well 
as the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to 
subject all data to analysis; to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past 
would be present to its eyes. The perfection that the human mind has been able to give to 
astronomy affords but a feeble outline of such an intelligence37”. 
 
Effectively this describes how it is imagined that, if the laws of physics are given and 
absolutely accurate, then every event will be preceded as well as followed by an endless chain 
of predictable events. If this is true, then the idea of determinism could be what is implied by 
the B-theories claiming that there is only one possible future, and that events there exist and 
have a truth-value while they have yet to pass through the present. 
 
To this day, as mentioned earlier, it is still being discussed whether or not determinism and 
                                                 
37 Hoefer: Causal Determinism, on Laplace 
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causality are absolutes, or if there is room in science for coincidence and free human agency. 
If, however, we follow the hardest definition of the term, we end up in another concept, 
namely that of fatalism. 
 
Fatalism 
Fatalism means that we can do nothing except for what we do. We might believe that we take 
choices, but in reality all our actions are governed, either by logic or by a supernatural entity, 
usually thought to be God. Governed by logic meaning that every choice we take is an effect 
of our developed capability for evaluation of a number of factors, like physical condition, 
external conditions, previous experience and so on. By searching for causes to take either of 
two choices, it follows that we will only ever take the choice that ends up seeming to us like 
having the best cause. 38 
 
If you will, picture yourself in the supermarket, waiting in line by the candy shelves. A 
particularly interesting piece of candy catches your fancy, and you struggle with your 
conscience over whether or not you should buy it. Really however, there is no struggle, as 
what takes place is an evaluation of how hungry you are, how much money you have, if 
you're currently on a diet and not supposed to eat candy, etc. There is no choice between two 
options, because according to fatalism, you are logically bound to take the most appealing 
one. You could go out and force yourself to take unappealing choices after reading this 
article, but they would simply be the effect of your awareness of the problem, and thus still 
not entirely ‘free’. 
 
Deciding whether it is God or the laws of physics that seal our fates is obviously a discussion 
in its own right. Fortunately it is not important to this project, as the point merely is that when 
we try to maintain our Principle of Bivalence in speaking about the future, we are logically 
and seemingly inevitably drawn to the conclusion that there is no such thing as an entirely 
‘free’ will. Not only does dealing with time tells us this, so does the premises for physical 
science! 
 
Discussion 
                                                 
38 Rice: Fatalism 
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In our introduction, we posed the question ‘how can time be explained’. Now that we have 
looked into the logic of time, the structure of time and the philosophy of time, we should have 
the basis to, if not answer the question, then at least to discuss the various explanations that 
have been put forth.  
 
Looking at the entirety of our project we start out by trying to deal with time physically, 
realising that the way we perceive it is through change. Discovering that we have little chance 
of perceiving it otherwise, it quickly becomes apparent that our opportunities for researching 
the physical nature of time are very limited, and that the way we tend to relate to it is in a 
more psychological and subjective manner (however, we still consider it an advantage for a 
philosophical theory to be compatible with the physical theory of time). 
 
The concept of change is captured in temporal logic in different ways by the A- and B-logics, 
since the temporal logic systems available have been shaped to suit the different theories. 
Thus temporal logic alone does not give an answer to what time is and how it can be 
explained. It is not possible to compare the various logic systems directly, since they take 
their points of departure in different philosophical backgrounds and put different emphasis on 
the importance of various logical principles. Besides, the logical analysis of statements tends 
to be more focused on linguistic issues than philosophical ones. 
 
When looking at branching and linear time, we notice how the structures are also mostly 
treated in a linguistic context, while being susceptible to translation into a more philosophical 
one. For instance talking about the truth-value of a future statement can sometimes be 
translated into talking about the truth of the event the statement tells of. Other times, like in 
Ockham’s case, the two realms are more distinct, and while speaking of the truth-value of a 
statement about the future is perfectly doable according to him, the truth of the actual event is 
presently not as easy to deal with.  
 
We find that in logic and language, the main difference between A- and B-theories emerge 
when trying to speak of one point in time in relation to another. In philosophy the distinction 
is whether or not the future is given. A-theories suggest that we maintain the 
past/present/future operators and that the events of the future are uncertain and hard to predict 
at best. B-theories on the other hand claims that points in time can only be dealt with as 
indexicals, by relating them to one another. This is so because, according to B-theorists, 
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events in the future are as real as those in the past and present, effectively locking their logical 
values as well as the course of the future itself. 
 
Our proposed ‘Direction A’ maintains the thought of a flowing, tensed time, where the future 
is uncertain and the thought of free human action preserved. That road ends abruptly, 
however, as the idea of anything being ‘uncertain’ clashes with the Principle of Bivalence, 
which our entire logical system is based upon. This would call for the demise of the logic 
system that is the base of natural science, therefore, our first inclination is to find another way 
around the problem, rather than face the task of reworking the logical system with a third 
truth-value. 
 
The A- and B-theories agree that we usually perceive time as flowing, however, as 
mentioned, the A-theories consider the flow of time objective while the B-theories argue that 
it is subjective. 
A-theories have been critisised for not being compatible with physics, and while some A-
theorists argue that they can create a tense logic, which allows for physical time to exist, this 
does not solve the philosophical problems involved.  
From a B-theorist’s perspective, A-theories imply that time is subjective and consequently 
does not fit well with any scientific theory, since science would look for an objective 
empirically provable theory.  
 
‘Direction B’ argues that time is a static dimension that we simply move through, giving us a 
subjective and illusory flow of time. The immediate effects is that the future seems to be set, 
and that it is thus easy for us to maintain the Principle of Bivalence and with it, our natural 
science. However, if the future is certain then there seems to be no validity in the idea that we 
humans ever choose anything, and then we are suddenly not as ‘free’ as we like to think we 
are.  
 
The ongoing discussion is thus what is more important: to accept the tensed view of time 
which breaks with the Principle of Bivalence or to honour the Principle of Bivalence and 
thereby have to accept the deterministic and existentialistic problems that follow from this. 
 
 41
Conclusion 
 
We arrive at the conclusion that currently, there are two main directions being taken towards a 
rational explanation to time. The defining difference between the two is the discussion about 
whether or not the future is given, and while the obvious choice for us would be to lean 
towards the one where it is not, that leaves us with a reasoning that hints at the insufficiency 
of the Principle of Bivalence. This principle is a basic premise for logic and natural science, 
and a perception that assumes the uncertainty of the future thus ends up in conflict with our 
entire logical system. 
 
The cold hard conclusion thus becomes that we have the option of trying to live with the 
flaws of one of the two ‘Directions’ we have talked about. The consequence of that being that 
we have to either rework our bi-valued logical system to let it deal with an uncertain future, or 
accept a determinist/fatalist worldview where freedom of choice is an illusion - Both ordeals 
being separate and more extensive projects into either logics or existentialism. Should we 
wish to deny the validity of both directions then we must either try to find a softer ‘middle-
direction’ that affords compatibility with both sides, or start all over with our reasoning about 
how time works. 
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Perspectives 
 
Although we feel that we have covered the issues and different perceptions of time in as how 
they directly relate to our cardinal question, that is not to say that this is the only way to deal 
with the concept of time. 
 
One could, for example, have chosen to take a direction more related to the natural sciences, 
and still have covered the concept of time, only in a very different form. We chose to keep the 
section on physical time/super time short, due to the fact that we felt that its relevance to us 
was exhausted, but if we, as a group, had different interests (and had studied the natural 
sciences), we might have taken that concept and gone much further. Perhaps we might have 
explored things like the function of time in quantum mechanics, mathematics and so forth. 
We might also have looked closer at the notion of super time, for example by asking ‘If time 
is unrelated to change, and the universe was changeless before the big bang, did time exist 
before it (the bang)?’ 
 
Another direction might be one more focused on ethics, religion and time’s relevance in the 
discussion of these. A concept which could be explored if this direction was taken, could be 
one where the concepts of determinism/fatalism, which we also look at, were examined with a 
greater emphasis on the ethical implications of having free will contra the hand of God 
directing man’s fate, or any other form of  time where free will is lacking. A more in depth 
look at the eastern religions’ notions of time, including circular time, might also have been 
relevant in this approach, maybe comparing them theologically to the linear time model more 
common in western religious thought. 
 
Time in the study of language was also something we could have delved more into. Although 
we feel we have covered this to such a degree as was relevant to our project, an alternative 
version of the project might have made this a bigger priority. We could have looked at time as 
a linguistic operator and its role in shaping language, and language’s role in shaping our 
common perception of time. Although our sections and our mentioning of the linguistic 
dimensions of time are present (as with the references to Ockham, the chapter on the structure 
of time and the section on temporal logic), it might have been possible for us to expand on 
this and make it a greater focus of our project. This might have been achieved, for example, 
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through a greater look at the works of Quentin Smith39 and his arguments against presentism, 
through linguistic arguments. It would have made for a very different focus in the project, but 
might have had interesting results nonetheless. 
 
                                                 
39 Smith, The Phenomology of A-Time, 1988 
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Group Process and Dynamics 
 
In dealing with the ‘The Logic and Structure of Time’, we have time and time again found 
ourselves in endless discussions on how to handle this highly complicated topic.   
 
When writing the project, we found out that the first thing for us to do, was in fact to read, 
read and read. The first two months of the semester we did not write much, because we had to 
read and understand our chosen subject. This proved to be quite difficult and resulted in a lot 
of discussions, when we realised that we were all equally confused, but slowly after 
discussing the read materials and especially after consulting our supervisor, Vincent F. 
Hendricks, we started getting a grip on the subject. A frequently heard comment at the group 
meetings would be a description of how, in trying to grasp the theme of the texts, we could 
feel headaches lurching.  
 
As mentioned previously, we did not write anything during that first period, and it was not 
until the mid term seminar that we actually got something down on paper. Actually writing 
something was a relief, because it meant that it was possible for us to get what we read down 
on paper whilst at the same time taking a critical stance towards it. 
The mid term seminar was very beneficial for us, in that it gave us a sense of direction as to 
where we wanted to take our project. Before that we had a vague idea, but after having heard 
the opponent group, their supervisor as well as our supervisor, we developed a very strong 
idea as to how the project should proceed.  
 
In choosing a topic like this, we also, however, found ourselves in difficulties from time to 
time. We had many discussions as to how a text should be interpreted and the fact that the 
theme was so complex meant that we had a tendency to neglect the deadlines we set for 
ourselves with regards to producing pages. We realised that it took a lot longer than 
anticipated to write down and analyse what we read. Furthermore we found out that all of us 
are types with a tendency to wait for the very last moment with writing – we wrote better with 
a bit of stress as a motivator. 
Luckily our supervisor was very good at motivating us, when we needed a kick! 
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We have been very fortunate in finding a group, where everyone was very open to discussions 
and critique – we did not have any major issues with people in the group. Rather we had 
issues with the collected group mentality as a whole, because we had a tendency to be a bit 
too relaxed and casual at times. 
 
If we had to focus on points of improvement it could definitely be a matter of trying to be a 
bit more productive at an earlier stage, seeing as there was quite a lot of waste of time at some 
of the group meetings and in general. Furthermore some people from the group have once 
more (and hopefully really learned it!) realised how time consuming writing such a project is, 
which means that it is necessary to cut back on work, etc. in order to avoid stress. 
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Summary 
 
Dette projekt tager sit udgangspunkt i spørgsmålet ‘Hvordan forklares tid?’. Det er et 
spørgsmål der har rødder i både logik, epistemologi og metafysik. 
Vores fremgangsmåde har således været at sætte os ind i den logiske og strukturelle 
opbygning af forskellige tidsmodeller, for derefter at se på deres filosofiske implikationer. 
Udgangspunktet har været kort at gennemgå forskellige ideer om fysisk tid, især problemerne 
hermed, hvilket ledte os til at fokusere på psykologisk tid, eftersom tid kun giver mening for 
os i form af den måde vi opfatter den på. 
For at have en basis for at diskutere teorier om psykologisk tid, har vi valgt at tage 
udgangspunkt i logikken, fra Aristoteles’ argument om ‘Søslaget i morgen’ til de logiske 
systemer tilknyttet A- og B-teorier. Hovedproblemet ligger i, om udsagn om fremtiden kan 
siges at have en sandhedsværdi når de bliver fremsagt, sådan som bivalens princippet 
(‘ethvert udsagn er enten sandt eller falsk’) siger. Dette leder os til at se nærmere på tidens 
struktur, bla. ved hjælp af forskellige grafiske modeller, som viser fremtidens sandhedsværdi 
ifølge forskellige teorier. 
Der er tre modeler af tid; linær, cirkulær og forgrenende. Ifølge den linære model er fremtiden 
givet. Dette gælder også den cirkulære, med den tilføjelse at tiden gentager sig selv. Den 
forgrenende model lægger op til at, hvorimod fortiden er fastlagt, så ligger fremtiden åben, 
med mange mulige fremtider. 
Vi har valgt ikke at koncentrere os om den cirkulære model, da den hovedsagelig er religiøst 
funderet. Vi er derimod gået videre til at undersøge to kategorier af filosofiske teorier, der 
svarer til henholdsvis den forgrenende og linære struktur; A-teorier og B-teorier. 
A-teorier ser tid og tidens bevægelse, eller ‘flow’, som hændelser i forhold til fortid, nutid og 
fremtid, mens B-teorier ser hændelser i forhold til hinanden, dvs. B sker før C men efter A. 
Disse to vidt forskellige måder at se tid på leder til forskellige problemer. A-teorier og den 
forgrenende model, og dermed det syn at fremtiden ikke er givet, leder til at bivalens 
princippet må opgives, da udsagn om fremtiden således ikke kan gives en sandhedsværdi i 
dag. B-teorierne derimod overholder bivalens princippet, til gengæld leder det til 
determinisme, da fremtiden i så fald er givet på forhånd. Begge teorier har således store 
filosofiske konsekvenser, da vi enten må se bort fra det i logikken basale princip at ethvert 
udsagn enten er sandt eller falsk, eller også må vi acceptere determinisme og dermed at vi 
ikke har nogen fri vilje. 
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Vores konklusion er dermed, at kan vi ikke acceptere et af disse synspunkter, er det 
nødvendigt enten at finde en blødere middelvej som kan forene A- og B-teorier, eller også 
starte på ny med vores tanker om hvordan tid fungerer. 
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